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Abstract
We develop a model of remedy offers made to an expert agency which has
powers to act before any harm is experienced and is required to decide on
the basis of tangible evidence. The model provides a relationship between
the factors determining the probability of delay and the type of error in early
settlements (i.e. insufficient versus excessive remedy). We apply the model
using data from European Commission merger settlements. Our econometric
analysis confirms the importance of delay costs and the uncertainty associated
with the agency’s findings. Our results are also consistent with the prediction
that delay is not systematically related to the inherent competitive harm of the
merger proposal. We use our results to identify specific cases of insufficient
remedy in early settlements.
Keywords: Delayed agreement; settlement; Type 1 and Type 2 errors; EC
merger control; merger remedies
JEL: K21 - Antitrust Law; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompet-
itive Practices
1 Introduction
There is a substantial theoretical literature on the settlement of private cases before
they go to court. The basic framework is an alleged harm caused to B (plaintiff)
by the actions or negligence of A (defendent). A and B are private parties with
unrestricted freedom to reach agreement out of court. In this literature, the harm
cannot be reversed so the settlement is over the size of a transfer payment. However,
the nature of a settlement changes if the harm has yet to happen. The settlement
∗We are grateful for comments from Stephen Davies, Rachel Griffiths, Morten Hviid, Kai-Uwe
Kühn , Andrei Medvedev, Peter Moffat, Eric Rasmusen, Greg Shaffer and seminar participants
at the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics Annual Conference, Royal Eco-
nomic Society Annual Conference 2009, Loughborough University, University of Michigan, Euro-
pean Commission, WIFO and the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy. We also thank Andrea
Isoni, Laurence Mathieu and Sebastian Peyer for help with translation. The support of the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Council (UK) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
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can then either over-restrict A’s activities and behaviour (Type 1 error), or provide
B with insufficent protection (Type 2 error). When the potential harm could be
experienced by many parties (e.g. B may be A’s customers), transaction costs may
justify the establisment of an expert agency with legally delegated powers to act
on behalf of the wider group. The agency operates in a legal system and must be
able to justify its actions in court if settlement is not reached. Depending on the
legal system, the role of the court may be to decide whether the agency made its
decision following the appropriate process (i.e. judicial review). This is the setting
we investigate in this paper. Alternatively, the court may have the power to make
its own decision on the merits of the case.
We apply the model in the context of merger regulation. A merger may be
welfare-enhancing if it creates efficiencies, but it can reduce welfare if it increases
market power and reduces competition. This delicate balance justifies merger
control by a competition agency which can prohibit mergers that are expected to
lessen competition. In practice, few mergers are entirely prohibited. Instead, the
agency accepts a remedy offer that the evidence suggests will eliminate the parts
of a merger that are likely to lessen competition while allowing the remainder to
merge.1
Merger appraisal is usually determined by a two-phase process, the details of
which are jursidiction specific.2 For example, consider merger regulation by the
European Commission. In the first phase, the agency conducts a limited investi-
gation of the likely competitive impact of the merger, towards the end of which the
merging parties may propose a set of remedies. If they are proposed, the agency
has a short period of time to assess the appropriateness of the offer and, based on
its evidence, it either clears the merger subject to the proposal or refers the merger
to the second phase. If settlement is not reached in the first phase and the merg-
ing parties decide to pursue the merger into the second phase, the agency conducts
a more detailed investigation and the merging parties can revise their proposal.
The agency clears the merger if it deems the final offer appropriate but, if there is
still no settlement after the second phase, the merger is prohibited. The merging
parties can appeal for ‘judicial review’ of the decision in court on the grounds that
the agency did not follow due process or made a manifest error. If the court finds
against the agency in its judicial review, it cannot substitute its own decision but
it requires the agency to take into account all its evidence and to interpret it more
1Remedies are usually ‘structural’ where the merging parties divest some assets, such as certain
products or product rights in particular geographic markets. Alternatively, they can be ‘behav-
ioural’ where the merged entity’s behaviour in certain markets is restricted post-merger for a given
period.
2 In the EU, there are explicit Phases I and II. In the USA, the Second Request is the equivalent
of Phase II. In the UK, the two phases are undertaken by independent institutions (the OFT and
Competition Commission).
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carefully.3 An adverse finding by the court therefore finds against the agency’s
professional competence in handling the case. In the US, the role of the court
is different as it re-evaluates the evidence and makes its own decision. Different
jurisdictions may also differ in who has the effective right to make the last offer of
remedies.4
In this paper, we make use of three institutional features of European Commis-
sion merger regulation in order to structure and test a model of the probability of
delay in settlement (i.e. referral to the second phase investigation). The first two
features guide our modelling of remedy offers and the third facilitates econometric
application.
First, in each phase there are statutory time limits on investigations and there
is a precise timetable for the merging parties’ final offer. This means that the
agency’s precision in identifying harmful activities is constrained, especially in the
shorter first phase. The agency can only accept or decline what the firms have
offered. It cannot make a counter-proposal. Although there is communication
between the merging parties and the agency before the final offer is proposed, such
communication is cheap talk as the Commission makes its decision only after the
final offer deadline.5
Second, the Commission must base its decisions on the evidence it collects or
it would be exposed to a court judgement impugning its professional competence.6
It is highly unlikely that a European judge would accept a subtle argument on the
basis of the screening or signalling value of an offer by the merging parties, even
when it would be rational for a private plaintiff to use such information. In this
context, the agency cannot act strategically in the sense of setting case-specific
acceptance rules conditioned on the size of offer. The agency must accept, refer
or prohibit on the basis of its available evidence, which is not updated in the light
of the offer. Consequently, offers by the merging parties are strategic only in the
sense that the firms have two opportunities to make final offers, one in each phase,
and the first phase offer may be used to attempt an advantageous settlement or to
reveal information about the agency’s initial evidence.
Third, every merger decision is published in the form of a standardised report.
3As Whish (2003) puts it: “Of particular significance will be a failure by the Commission to
give a fair hearing; a failure to articulate properly the reasoning behind the decision; and a failure
to base a decision on adequate evidence." [p.278] It is because of the nature of judicial review as
a professional discipline that we do not model it explicitly as a further element of the uncertainty
in determining offers. The time scale of a judicial review is also such that a prohibited merger
has never been resurrected after a successful appeal.
4For example, this is the agency in the UK with the firms only able to either accept the offer
or withdraw from the merger or appeal for judicial review.
5A recent judgment by the European General Court confirms the importance of the final offer
deadline for the merging parties (Ryainair’s appeal against its prohibited merger with Aer Lingus;
case T-342/07, 6 July 2010).
6See Vesterdorf (2005) for evidentiary requirements as set out by a leading judge, and Scott
(2007) and Zhu (2006) for summary comparisons of the US and EU systems of merger control.
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This includes settlements and means that a consistent database can be created for
a large number of mergers. In particular, we are able to construct measures of
the merger-specific parameters which our theory suggests should influence remedy
offers, including proxies for the cost of referral and the accuracy of the agency’s
evidence.
Our model aims to capture the essential features of the EC merger remedy
procedure. The agency’s delegated task is to allow any merger unless it finds
evidence of likely competitive harm beyond offered remedies. The merging firms
calculate an optimal Phase I remedy offer which we show to depend on the cost of
delay (i.e. referral to Phase II) and the uncertainty associated with the agency’s
expected findings, but not systematically on the potential harm of the merger.
This offer provides a link between the type of error (over- or under-enforcement)
and observable characteristics of the merger. While offers and errors themselves
are not observable, we do know if the merger was settled in Phase I or Phase II.
This allows us to test the model empirically. We then use estimated probabilities
of referral to identify specific mergers that are likely to have been settled with each
type of error.
Our empirical results confirm the model’s positive predictions that referral to
Phase II is more likely if the opportunity cost of delay is relatively small and the
agency’s decision is more uncertain. The uncertainty effect on settlements has
received only limited previous support from the empirical tort literature. As also
predicted by our model, referral does not appear sensitive to the potential harm of
the merger.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our theory
of remedy agreement and discusses alternative assumptions.7 Section 3 develops
the empirical implementation and introduces the data. Section 4 presents our
econometric results and discusses them in relation to the wider empirical literatures
on tort and merger regulation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Offer, Delay and Error in Settlement
2.1 The model
A proposed acquisition is represented as a set of business assets, some of which
may currently compete to a greater or lesser extent with the acquiring firm’s busi-
nesses. Some combinations of these assets are efficiency enhancing while other
combinations have anti-competitive effects. For example, the assets may comprise
capacity to produce a homogeneous product. Acquisition of all of this capacity
7There have been few other attempts to model bargaining over remedies in merger regula-
tion. Farrell (2003) applies Nash bargaining to determine the appropriate welfare standard of a
competition agency.
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would facilitate previously unsustainable tacit collusion, whereas acquisition of only
a proportion would have no substantial anticompetitive effect. Alternatively, the
proposed acquisition may take the form of a portfolio of differentiated products
which each have different cross-elasticities of demand with the aquirer’s existing
product range. Some product combinations would create unilateral market power
while others would have no substantial effect.8
Define α as a ranked division of the acquired assets: α ∈ [0, 1]. Assets are
ranked such that those with higher rank are no less harmful to competition than
those ranked lower. Define α̂ ∈ (0, 1) as the proportion of assets such that those
ranked α ≤ α̂ have no substantial adverse effect on competition, while assets ranked
α > α̂ substantially lessen competition if retained. This ensures that a settlement
which allows the merged entity to keep exactly α̂ of the assets is both desirable and
feasible. Write α = α̂+ z, then any remedy that is approved with z < 0 is a Type
1 error, whereas z > 0 is a Type 2 error.9 A settlement that allows the merged
entity to retain α generates profit pi(α̂, z) > 0 where piα̂(.) > 0 and piz(.) > 0. We
assume that pi(.) is log-concave in z. This limits the extent to which marginal
profits can increase with z and is one of two sufficient conditions for a concave
profit function.
There is an agency whose delegated task is to allow any merger unless it finds
evidence of likely competitive harm having taken account of offered remedies. The
agency understands the principles of competition but initially lacks detailed knowl-
edge of the market. It can therefore rank the assets by likely anticompetitive effect
but is uncertain of α̂. The merging parties have detailed knowledge of the market
and are fully informed. The timing of the settlement process is as follows. In
Phase I, the merging parties make a remedy offer, α̂+zO1 . The agency investigates
the appropriateness of the offer and gathers evidence that the required remedy
is α̂ + z1. If z1 ≥ zO1 , the agency approves the merger subject to the proposed
remedy and the firms receive pi(α̂, zO1 ). If z1 < z
O
1 , settlement is not reached and
the merging parties can choose to withdraw the merger application (and receive
pi(0, 0) = 0) or proceed to Phase II which involves a cost of delay, K > 0. If the
merging parties proceed to Phase II, they make a revised remedy offer, α̂ + zO2 ,
which can be higher, lower or the same as they made in Phase I. The agency again
investigates the appropriateness of the offer and this provides a second estimate
of the required remedy, α̂ + z2. We initally assume that the agency learns the
truth in Phase II (i.e. z2 = 0) and discuss relaxation of this assumption in section
2.4. For convenience, we refer to zO1 < 0 as a “cautious” offer and z
O
1 > 0 as an
“aggressive” offer.
8 In the case of an airline merger, the assets may be city-pair routes or time slots at a congested
airport.
9The cost of error depends on the social loss associated with these assets being held in socially
inefficient ownership.
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The agency draws its first phase evidence from a distribution F (z1, s) with
positive density f(z1, s) on its support. s is a mean-preserving index of the dis-
tribution’s spread. z1 ∈ [z1(s), z1(s)] is a random variable, z1(s) ∈ [−α̂, 0],
z1(s) ∈ [0, 1 − α̂], z1(0) = z1(0) = 0 ,
dz
1
(s)
ds
< 0 and dz1(s)
ds
> 0. We make two
economically-motivated assumptions about the shape of the distribution. First,
the agency is no less likely to find evidence nearer the truth than it is to find
evidence further from it, so it is unimodal with the mode at z1 = 0. Second,
the evidence distribution is unbiased, so the mean is also zero for all s. These
assumptions imply Fs(.) ≷ 0 as z1 ≶ 0. We also make two technical assumptions:
the density at the lower bound does not increase in the spread (i.e.
df(z
1
(s),s)
ds
≤ 0);
and log concavity of 1−F (.). The former is a natural part of our definition of in-
creasing spread. The latter is a standard restriction in the literature and together
with log-concavity of pi(.) is sufficient to ensure a locally concave profit function.10
2.2 Early settlement and type of error
We begin by providing results and intuition from the model with a general distri-
bution as set out above. We then illustrate this with the example of a uniform
distribution before discussing generalisations including when the second phase does
not reveal the truth. All proofs are provided in Appendix A.
With a fully accurate second phase investigation, the optimal remedy offer in
Phase II is z∗2 = 0 and expected profit conditional on having reached Phase II is
pi∗2(α̂,K) = max {0, pi (α̂, 0)−K}. The non-negativity constraint derives from the
firms’ ability to withdraw from the merger if pi (α̂, 0) − K ≤ 0 and receive zero.
The withdrawal case is considered in Appendix A. For clarity in the text, we focus
on mergers for which it would be worthwhile for the firms to incur the costs of a
Phase II investigation if there is no agreement in Phase I; i.e. pi(α̂, 0) − K > 0.
The probability of the Phase I offer being rejected is F (zO1 , s); i.e. the probability
that z1 < zO1 . F (.) is the probability of referral and its complement, 1 − F (.), is
the probability of settlement. Expected profit is:
pi1 = pi
(
α̂, zO1
)
[1− F (zO1 , s)] + F (z
O
1 , s)[pi (α̂, 0)−K].
If there is an internal optimal offer in Phase I, z∗1 , it satisfies:
piz (α̂, z
∗
1) [1− F (z
∗
1, s)]− [pi (α̂, z
∗
1)− pi(α̂, 0) +K]f(z
∗
1 , s) = 0. (1)
z∗1 thus balances the marginal profit of a more aggressive offer weighted by the
probability of acceptance, against the cost of delayed agreement weighted by the
10See Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for log-concavity of 1−F (.)
and its relation to other economic assumptions. Bebchuk (1984), Nalebuff (1987) and Spier (1992)
make the same assumption.
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marginal risk of rejection. However, there need not always be an internal optimum.
For some parameter constellations combining high costs of delay and a low spread
of evidence, it is optimal for the merging firms to eliminate all risk of their proposal
being rejected by offering z∗1 = z1 and getting approval for sure. These internal and
corner optimality conditions imply a direct relationship (summarised in appendix
Lemma 4) between the key parameters characterising the merger proposal (α̂, s
and K) and the remedy offer made by the firms (z∗1).
If the agency’s draw from the evidence distribution happens to be z1 > z
∗
1, the
offer will be accepted but if z1 < z
∗
1, the merger will be referred. Proposition 1
focuses on accepted offers. Defining Type 1 error as an accepted offer of z∗1 < 0
(i.e. over-enforcement), and Type 2 error as an accepted offer of z∗1 > 0 (i.e. under-
enforcement), the proposition describes the relationship between the type of error
and the parameters characterising the merger (α̂, s and K). The meaning of
‘sufficiently’ high or low is made precise in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 A merger settled in Phase I results in a Type 1 (Type 2) error if
K is sufficiently high (low) and s is sufficiently low (high). The type of error has
no monotonic relationship with α̂.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. A higher cost of delay to the
firms induces them to be more cautious in their Phase I offers. At one extreme, if
there is no cost of delay (K = 0), firms lose nothing by making an aggressive Phase
I offer. If the agency agrees to settle, this implies a Type 2 error. On the other
hand, if the costs of delay are large, firms make a cautious offer and settlement
implies a Type 1 error. The potential harm of a merger does not have a first
order effect in determining how much to push or concede in Phase I because the
marginal benefits and costs are anchored around the truth, α̂. In relation to s,
there is little room for bluffing the agency if it is expected to be able to form a
very accurate opinion about the merger in Phase I. The cost of a cautious offer
is small in relation to the gain in probability of settlement. Only when there is
a reasonable chance of the agency not finding evidence against an aggressive offer
will the firms find it profitable to risk one. The deeper intuition in relation to s is
explored below in the example of the uniform distribution.
Proposition 1 cannot be tested empirically because remedy offers relative to
the social optimum are not observable. However, acceptance or rejection of the
offer by the agency is observed and can be tied to the probability of referral,
F (z∗1(α̂, s,K), s). The effects of α̂ and K on this probability are straightforward;
for example,
dF (z∗
1
,s)
dK
= f(z∗1, s)
dz∗
1
dK
< 0 (by Proposition 1). Given our relatively
general evidence distribution, it is not possible to derive a continuous relationship
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with s. However, we can show that there is a critical ŝ at which the optimal offer
involves no error, z∗1 = 0, and given an unbiased evidence distribution, F (0, ŝ) =
1
2 .
For all s > ŝ, z∗1 > 0 and the probability of referral is greater than a half, and for
all s < ŝ, z∗1 < 0 and the probability of referral is less than a half.
Corollary 1 The probability of a merger being referred to Phase II is decreasing
in K and positively associated with s, but has no systematic relationship with α̂.
After noting that cautious offers are more likely to be accepted than aggressive
ones, the intuition is exactly the same as for Proposition 1. A second corollary
links the empirically observable probability of settlement to the normative type of
error. It follows directly from Proposition 1, Corollary 1 and the assumption of
an unbiased evidence distribution.
Corollary 2 If the ex ante probability of referral is greater (less) than 12 and the
merger is settled in Phase I , there will be a Type 2 (Type 1) error in the settlement.
Corollary 2 is a distinctive feature of this paper because it links unobservable
welfare errors to the quasi-observable probability of referral.11 The following
empirical work provides econometric support for Corollary 1 and so lends empirical
support to Proposition 1 and Corollary 2. It allows us to argue, for example, that
if remedies are agreed in Phase I despite a low K and high s, which predict a high
probability of referral, the firms will have been risking an aggressive offer and got
away with an anticompetitive merger (Type 2 error).
2.3 An example
To understand the intuition of Proposition 1 further, consider the example of: (a)
constant marginal profitability of assets (pi(α̂, z) = [α̂+ z]pi); and (b) uniform
evidence distribution (z1 ∼ U [−s, s] with α̂ ∈ [s, 1−s]).
12 The general probability
of referral is F (zO1 , s) =
s+zo
1
2s . It is straightforward to show that z
∗
1 = max(−s,
1
2 [s−
K
pi
]) so the corresponding probability of referral is F (z∗1, s) = max(0,
1
4 [3 −
K
spi
]).
K/pi can be interpreted as the firms’ cost of referral relative to the marginal value
of retained assets. The top panel of Figure 1 maps the optimal offer and the lower
panel maps the consequent probability of referral.
Start from s = 0. It is optimal to offer the socially optimal remedy because
the agency already knows the truth. As the distribution spreads, at first there is
little to be lost from playing safe and eliminating the risk that an unlucky draw of
11We use “quasi-observable” in the sense that observed frequencies can be used to estimate
probabilities.
12See Lyons and Medvedev (2007) for an early version of this example.
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Figure 1: Settlement error, delay and uncertainty: example of uniform distribution
and linear profit
evidence by the agency might result in a referral. However, for s > s˜ = K/3pi, it
is worth trading off a small risk of referral against retaining more assets from the
merger. For s > ŝ = K/pi, the trade-off becomes such that it is optimal to ‘bluff’
the agency by offering an insufficient remedy. Put another way, the firms are more
likely to bluff the agency when they have a low relative cost of delayed agreement.
For s < ŝ, an accepted offer is a Type 1 error and the probability of referral
< 12 , and for s > ŝ, an accepted offer is a Type 2 error and the probability of
referral > 12 . The scale of Type 1 error peaks at s˜, but the scale of Type 2 error
increases monotonically in s. Each of s˜, ŝ and the scale of maximum Type 1 error
are increasing in the cost of referral relative to the value of the merger. Finally
and consistent with Proposition 1, the optimal offer and probability of delay are
independent of the potential harm of the merger, α̂.
2.4 Discussion
Our theoretical model is in the tradition of the literature on tort settlements (i.e.
damages) in which delay in reaching agreement is due to asymmetric information.13
13An earlier literature models delay due to intransigence or mistakes; e.g. Landes (1971), Gould
(1973), Posner (1973), Shavell (1982). See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a detailed review.
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The essential idea behind these models can be illustrated by a first stage of ultima-
tum bargaining followed, if there is no early settlement, by a costly second stage
where a court finds the truth. Only one party is fully informed. The uninformed
side knows the distribution of ‘types’ which is common knowledge, as are the costs
of delay. If the uninformed party makes the last offer, he can use this to screen
for the other’s true type.14 If the informed party makes the last offer, this may be
taken by the uninformed party as a signal of her type.15 Both types of model result
in qualitatively similar predictions. Cases with low levels of damage settle early
and those with high true damages are more likely to proceed to court. Early agree-
ment is also less likely the greater the uncertainty as to the true type and the lower
the costs of going to court. Our model has many similarities to Bebchuk (1984).16
However, the damage has already been done in a tort so there are no Type 1 or
2 errors with respect to the agreement, only costs of delay.17 In ex ante merger
control there is no prior damage but the agency’s decision may permit future harm
or prevent future benefit. Merger control is thus not completely adversarial. Its
aim is to allow the efficient parts of the merger while preventing anti-competitive
elements.
Three assumptions in our model merit further attention: certainty in the second
phase; the agency’s acceptance rule; and continuous divisibility of assets.
So far we have considered the case where the Phase II investigation discovers
the truth. Suppose the agency draws its evidence for the second phase from a
distribution that has less spread than the first (s2 < s). If evidence is not carried
forward between phases and the two evidence distributions are independent, our
results are essentially unchanged as there is no strategic link between phases. Phase
II is the same as the ‘withdrawal if no agreement’ Phase I case already developed
and, if there is an interior optimum, s2 > 0 may lead to occasional prohibitions.
Proposition 1 and the corollaries are unchanged.
If s2 is related to s, or if evidence from the first phase is carried forward, there is
no longer strategic independence between phases. For example, suppose evidence
from the first phase is known to be used in the second, then even though the
second phase draw may be unbiased, the carried forward evidence is likely to be
biased because referral is more likely when the agency has a negative draw. Even
though the firms do not know z1, they can infer it from the fact that their offer
14See Bebchuk (1984), Nalebuff (1987), Spier (1992).
15See Reinganum and Wilde (1986). See Schweizer (1989) and Daughety and Reinganum (1994)
for models of two-sided uncertainty.
16Like Reinganum and Wilde (1986) our model has the informed party making the offer while
Bebchuk (1984) has the uninformed party doing so (screening). However, we depart from the
former in not allowing the agency to infer evidence from proposals. We discuss this below. Papers
applying tort models empirically are discussed in Section 4.4.
17Tort claims do have distributional effects and these alter the long-term incentives to avoid
accidents or negligence. Inappropriate incentives can thus induce Type 1 or 2 errors in the
system as a whole, but not in the specific case in dispute.
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was rejected and this will affect their expected profit if they enter Phase II. More
precisely, Ez1 =
1
F (zO
1
,s)
∫ zO
1
z
1
zf(z, s)dz < zO1 and the more cautious is their first
phase offer, the worse the firms will expect the agency’s finding on expected harm.
This may induce a more aggressive Phase I offer as a commitment to less caution in
Phase II.18 The effect ofK is unchanged, but carried-forward evidence considerably
complicates the analysis of s. Nevertheless, we have no reason to expect the spirit
of our results from the basic model to be substantially undermined.
In practice, while the second phase is unlikely to be completely accurate, the
nature of the analysis carried out by the agency typically changes and this may
limit the extent to which first phase findings bias Phase II. For example, the first
phase focus on structural measures based on market shares shifts to a more subtle
analysis of competitive effects. This qualitative change in the type of analysis
weakens any link between s and s2.
19
Next, consider the agency’s acceptance rule. In the introduction, we argue
from the legal context that all decisions must be backed by evidence that would be
acceptable to a court. In Europe, the merging firms are also legally required to
make the final offer to the agency. This is the context that motivates our model
specification. The agency accepts the firms’ offer if it is no more aggressive than
is consistent with the agency’s draw from the evidence distribution; i.e. accept if
and only if z1 ≥ z
O
1 . This simple acceptance rule is optimal in certain specific
circumstances. For example, in the capacity interpretation of assets efficiencies
may increase welfare as long as the merging parties acquire no more than α̂ of the
acquired firm’s capacity, but any larger acquisition relaxes the incentive compati-
bility constraints sufficiently to facilitate collusion, which results in reduced welfare
(even compared with prohibition).
However, this is not generally an optimal acceptance rule for two reasons. First,
it takes no account of: the welfare loss of a settlement that deviates slightly from
α̂; or the costs of a second phase investigation to either the agency or the firms.
Second, our rule results in predictable biases that depend on the characteristics of
the merger. Suppose the agency were to develop a more complex acceptance rule
of the form: accept if and only if ρ(z1, s,K) ≥ zO1 . If this was public knowledge,
the merging firms would try to adapt their offer to signal a high α̂. This is a
complex problem and would introduce considerable legal uncertainty. This paper
aims to model actual behaviour of an agency subject to legal rules. It reflects
the practice of the European General Court which will support a prohibition even
18A similar effect is identified in Nalebuff’s (1987) signaling argument linking first phase offers
to credible second phase actions.
19Only 12.3% of Phase II decisions 1990-2010 were prohibitions (10.8% in our 1999-2006 sample).
This is consistent with reasonable accuracy in Phase II, though it is possible that it also reflects
cautious offers.
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if the competitive harm affects only a very small part of the transaction.20 This
paper is not about the optimality of those rules, but even if it were, the simple rule
has advantages. For example, it provides clear guidance to business executives and
their legal advisers, agencies find complex rules difficult to implement internally,
and a judge is unlikely to be convinced by subtle signaling arguments. A sharp rule
for the agency also has the strategic advantage of discouraging firms from making
making a somewhat anticompetitive offer in the expectation that the agency will
accept it as being within the margin of error.
Finally, we have assumed that α is continuously divisible. In practice, merger
case assets are usually lumpy and in each case there will be a finite set of potential
divisions of those assets. Continuity is assumed as a useful simplification for
modelling purposes. We have no reason to expect it to affect our general results.
3 Data and Measurement
3.1 Sample selection and data availability
Explicit merger regulation was first introduced at the EU level with the ECMR
(1989). Initially, there was significant uncertainty as to the legality of remedy
settlements in Phase I and this was not clarified until 1997.21 The dataset is con-
structed from mergers notified and completed under the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission between 1999 and 2006 inclusive. This period encompasses another major
revision to the ECMR, which came into effect in May 2004.22 Amongst other
reforms, this modestly increased the time available for investigation and modified
the substantive test for a merger.23 Simultaneous reforms included issuance of the
first indicative merger guidelines, appointment of a chief competition economist
with supporting team, and a major internal reorganisation of DG Competition.24
We return to this in section 3.2.3.
20For example, in the Ryanair appeal judgment (case T-342/07, #326), the Court writes: “The
creation of a dominant position which would have the effect of significantly distorting genuine
competition on one of those routes is itself sufficient to make the transaction incompatible with
the common market”.
21See revision to Art.6(1) in Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 amending
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 180,
9.7.1997, p.1-6).
22See Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (OJ L 24, 29.01.2004, p1-22).
23The Phase I limit rose from one month or six weeks if remedies are proposed, to 25 working
days or 35 working days with remedies. The Phase II limit rose from four months to 90 working
days or 105 working days if remedies are proposed. The change from the ’dominance test’ to a
’substantial impediment to effective competition’ test was not proposed to be a major change in
practice and it has not turned out to be so. Its main substantive purpose was to allow challenges
to a very small number of mergers between firms not ranked #1 in the market but where tacit
collusion may become possible (see Lyons, 2009). Its wider purpose was to approve what had
become the practice of appraising economic effects rather than applying structural rules.
24See Lyons (2009) for a summary of these changes.
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Merger decisions in our sampling frame of interventions fall into four catagories:
(i) remedy settlements in Phase I (109 mergers); (ii) remedy settlements in Phase II
(52 mergers); (iii) unconditional clearances in Phase II (18 mergers); and (iv) out-
right prohibitions (9 mergers).25 Of these, 38 could not be included in our sample
for three reasons. First, while mergers with both horizontal and vertical issues are
included, we removed nine mergers with exclusively vertical issues because we were
unable to construct comparable measures for a number of our variables. Second,
we excluded five cases in which the Commission referred aspects of the merger to
a national competition authority for further investigation, so the merger was only
partially covered by the Commission’s report.26 Third, market share data was not
reported in 24 of the merger decisions.27
Our sampling frame excludes two categories of merger that fall within EU ju-
risdiction: (a) unconditional clearances in Phase I (2062 mergers); and (b) with-
drawals (42 in Phase I and 22 in Phase II). Most mergers are unconditionally
cleared in Phase I. The vast majority are uncontroversial as they have a very low
risk of anti-competitive effects and are not relevant for investigating delay in set-
tlement. Phase II unconditional clearances are excluded on the grounds that they
are not anticompetitive mergers appropriate for remedy settlement. Nevertheless,
we investigate the consequences of their inclusion in Section 4.2.
No reports are published on merger proposals that are withdrawn by the merg-
ing parties, so we have no data on them. The exclusion of Phase I withdrawals is
unlikely to create substantial bias because they are usually for reasons outside the
antitrust process (e.g. change in market conditions). However, the exclusion of
Phase II withdrawals is potentially more problematic because a significant number
may have been in anticipation of a prohibition decision. We investigate this in
Section 4.2.
3.2 Measurement of variables
Proposition 1 predicts that the probability of referral to Phase II depends on the
degree of uncertainty in relation to the agency’s findings (s) and the cost of delay
to the merging parties (K) but not systematically on the potential harm of the
unremedied merger (inverse of α̂). We also control for unmodelled influences such
as broad industry and temporal effects. Our proxy measures are outlined below
25More formally, the decisions were made under (i) Articles 6.1(b) or 6.2 (post- and pre-2004
revisions to numbering, respectively); (ii) Article 8.2; (iii) Article 8.1 or 8.2 (i.e. post- and pre-2004
revisions to numbering, respectively); or (iv) Article 8.3.
26These mergers fall under Article 9.3 of the ECMR.
27This can occur if the published decision has been heavily censored to prevent sensitive infor-
mation from being in the public domain or when the merger has been analysed by the Commission
in a manner that differs from the norm. For example, in M.3796 — OMYA / J.M. Huber the
Commission argued that market shares were not a good approximation of market power and
consequently these were not reported.
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and summarised in Table 1. Technical details are in Appendix B.
3.2.1 Merging parties’ cost of referral (i.e. K)
We focus on the opportunity cost of delay in reaching agreement.28 Most mergers
involve multiple product and geographic markets. Given the merger cannot be im-
plemented until all markets are cleared, the merging parties lose out on achieving
potential efficiencies for the duration of the Phase II investigation even if only one
market is not settled in Phase I. If only a small number out of many markets is
subject to dispute, then this opportunity cost of delay is high relative to an other-
wise similar merger where most of the markets involve potentially anticompetitive
overlaps. We measure this opportunity cost of delay by the percentage of markets
with combined market share that is unlikely to be found anti-competitive: %no-
harmmkts. Anti-competitive effects of horizontal overlaps can arise due to either
unilateral or coordinated effects. The former are unlikely if the merging parties’
combined market share is sufficiently low.29 We adopt a 35% unilateral effects
threshold for two reasons. First, practitioners often consider 40% as a critical
rule-of-thumb for ‘dominance’, while market shares below 30% are unlikely to be
challenged for unilateral effects.30 Second, commercial confidentiality restricts the
reporting of market shares to a five or ten point range (e.g. a true share of 32%
might be reported as [30-40]%). In such circumstances we take the midpoint of the
reported range, so a strict inequality < 35% excludes most markets in the [30-40]%
range. The criteria for coordinated effects are more complex and we identify such
markets by using the Commission’s own reporting of where it had investigated this
as a serious issue.31 Finally, when counting the total number of markets, we ex-
clude any markets where the merged entity’s combined market share is below 15%.
This is to avoid a potential reporting bias across cases (see Appendix B for details).
3.2.2 Potential harm (i.e. inverse α̂)
To measure potential harm, we restrict ourselves to objective measurements and
avoid use of self-justifying subjective judgments by the agency which might have
28There are no case-specific data on managment and advice costs.
29See Davies et al (2011) for discussion of the factors that must be satisified for an EC finding
of coordinated effects.
30EC horizontal merger guidelines (EC, 2002) state market shares in excess of 50% are likely
to be evidence of a dominant position and those below 25% are unlikely to be so. However,
these percentages incorporate a certain amount of legal caution, especially for havens. This lower
threshold is repeated in the introduction to the revised merger regulation (EC, 2004), although
no market share guidance was provided in the original 1989 EC merger regulation. See Davies
and Lyons (2007) for evidence relating to the “40% rule”.
31We later check the robustness of our results by removing the few markets below the 35%
threshold that the decision identifies as possibly causing concern. Our results do not change.
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been written to support its decision.32 Instead, we count the number of markets
where there is a strong presumption for unilateral or coordinated effects: #har-
mmkts. The more such markets there are in a merger, the greater the potential
harm.33 We draw on the results of Davies et al (2011) to identfy an emprically
based presumption of market-specific harm as revealed by EC case practice. We
count a strong presumption for unilateral effects if the merged entity’s market share
is ≥ 50% and the incremental market share (i.e. the share of the smaller merging
party in that market) is ≥ 20%, or combined share ≥ 70% even with negligible in-
crement, or a linear sliding scale inbetween (e.g. combined shares of 60% of which
the increment is ≥ 10%).34 Our definition of a strong presumption for coordinated
effects is if: they are discussed as a serious issue by the Commission; our unilateral
effects threshold is not met; and both the merged entity’s combined market share
and the share of its largest independent rival are ≥ 35%. We also constructed a
range of alternative measures, based on either patterns of individual market shares
aggregated to the level of the merger, or the Commission’s own opinion that the
market raises a concern. None of the alternatives affected the significance of our
other variables and none was more significant than the one we report.35 More
detail on these sensitivity tests is included in Appendix B.
3.2.3 Uncertainty of the agency’s findings (i.e. s)
The merging parties must expect greater randomness in the agency’s findings if the
merger is complex and the agency is not well prepared to cope with the analysis.
More specifically, merging firms will be more uncertain of the agency’s findings if:
the agency’s resources are stretched by a high case load; the agency’s objectives and
procedures are opaque; the agency lacks experience in the relevant markets; there
is a large number of affected markets that require investigation; or the relevant
32 It might appear tempting to use the Commission’s decision to identify competitively relevant
variables such as product substitutability or barriers to entry. However, these are only patchily
mentioned in reports and it would be unwise to impute either ‘low’ or ‘high’ measures when no
such judgment is explicitly reported. More deeply, reporting of substituability and barriers can
be highly subjective and might be reported only when needed to bolster a decision.
33We could not weight markets by their value because this information is suppressed as being
commercially sensitive. Data of the merging parties’ annual worldwide turnover is available for
90 mergers. Using this restricted sample, we found no evidence that sales were related to referral
to Phase II, even when controlling for selection bias using a bivariate probit with sample selection.
34See also the Ryanair appeal (case T-342/07 at #10) for a standard rehearsal of the presumption
for shares greater than 50%.
35We prefer our share-based measure because it captures the ex ante information available to
the merging parties and their advisers. It does not depend on the Commission’s ex post opinion.
Only 15% of the markets captured by these share thresholds did not require a remedy. Our
emphasis on market share should not be taken as a belief that this is all that matters for merger
appraisal. It is not. Our claim is simply that share is an unbiased measure that is of substantial
relevance to the agency. #harmmkts seems to capture some degree of the potential harm of the
merger because the average number of such markets is 4.76 per merger in our full sample, but it
is only 0.36 per merger for Phase II unconditional clearances.
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economic theory of harm is new or difficult to appraise.
We measure case load by the number of mergers under investigation per 100
case officers employed by the Commission at the time: caseload. Case officers
include economists, lawyers and senior support staff available for case work. It is
possible that a very high case load may bring about a political economy response
of administrative ‘desk clearing’ agreements in order to limit the Phase II burden.
We include a squared term to test for this: caseloadsq.
The 2004 reforms may have affected the margin of error in the agency’s findings,
though it is not obvious a priori in which direction. On the one hand, any
change may raise uncertainty regarding procedures and protocol. On the other
hand, uncertainty will be reduced if most of the changes were designed to clarify
the agency’s approach (e.g. guidelines), streamline its processes and improve its
accuracy (e.g. extended time limits). We include a dummy variable for mergers
post-reform to pick up the net effect: 2004reform.
Given that merger control was not introduced until 1990, it may be expected
that the margin of error in the Commission’s decisions would be reduced over our
period as it gained experience. We measure general learning effects with a time
trend determined by the day on which the merger was notified: day. An industry-
specific learning effect is measured by the number of mergers investigated under
the ECMR in the same industry (3-digit NACE): indexp.36
A measurable dimension of the complexity of a merger itself is the number
of markets that require nontrivial analysis. The analysis is likely to be hardest
for markets that are ’intermediate’ in the sense that they are neither obviously
competitive nor obviously problematic. The competitive assessment is trivial if
very low market shares are combined, as it is obvious that a remedy is not required.
Markets with a very strong presumption of harm may also be easy to analyse, but
they may still add complexity if the parties claim market shares are misleading
indicators or if remedy design is difficult. If so, #harmmkts may also measure
a dimension of s. However, inasmuch as the most difficult analysis will be in
intermediate share markets, we count the total number of markets then subtract
both the number with a no-harm presumption (as defined in Section 3.2.2) and
#harmmkts to get a count of the number of markets on the margin of competitive
harm: #intermediatemkts.
Unilateral effects is the most common, least controversial and simplest theory
of harm investigated by the Commission. The analysis of other theories is com-
paratively less established and we expect firms to be more uncertain about the
Commission’s findings when these are investigated. We construct four dummy
variables for mergers where the Commission undertook serious analysis of: coordi-
36We also considered the Commission’s experience of the four theories of harm discussed below,
but found no robust results.
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nated effects (i.e. does the merger increase the likelihood or sustainability of tacit
collusion?): coordeffects;37 vertical effects (e.g. does the merger raise the incen-
tive and ability to foreclose rivals?): verteffects;38 conglomerate effects (e.g. might
bundling be used to foreclose rivals?): conglomeffects; and elimination of a poten-
tial competitor (i.e. might one of the merging parties become a future competitor
in a market in which they do not currently compete?): potcomp.
The competition analysis is also more complex if the parties argue that benefits
outweigh apparently anticompetitive effects. This may be the case if the acquired
firm would exit the market in the absence of the merger: failingfirm. A similar
difficulty can arise with an efficiency defence, especially as this has a history of
controversy in European merger control: efficiencydef.
3.2.4 Other factors
Moving beyond the factors identified in our model, we take account of possible
industry and nationality effects. To capture broad industry effects we identify
the one-digit industry (NACE) in which most of the merging firms’ activities take
place. Two-thirds of our sample was in manufacturing, which we use as our base.
Energy and telecommunications mergers were the next largest groups, so dummy
variables were created for: energy; telecom; and otherind (i.e. non-manufacturing
and non-utility). These are intended to pick up unobserved determinants of referral
that are correlated with broad technological or demand factors.
It is possible that foreign firms find it harder to predict what the European
Commission may require. Alternatively, it is sometimes claimed that merger
control is subject to political pressures and bias. We tested for domicile effects
relative to the base of mergers between European (EEA) firms: eeaonly. Dummy
variables were created for mergers between: US firms (usonly); European and US
firms (eeaus); and all other nationality combinations (otherhome).
37Coordinated effects were known as ‘collective dominance’ prior to the revised merger regulation
in 2004. The Commission has commonly found analysis of coordinated effects difficult which is
evidenced by several appeal court decisions (see Kühn, 2002; and Lyons, 2009).
38Kovacic and Shapiro (2000) argue that foreclosure arguments can be used to protect competi-
tors and should be subject to a high standard of proof.
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variable description
phase2 1 if the merger was referred to Phase II; 0 otherwise
eeaonly 1 if the merging parties’ domiciles were in the EEA only; 0 other-
wise
usonly 1 if the merging parties’ domiciles were in the US only; 0 otherwise
eeaus 1 if the merging parties’ domiciles were in the EEA and the US;
0 otherwise
otherhome 1 if the merging parties’ domiciles are not in the three above cat-
egories; 0 otherwise
manufacturing 1 if the merging parties’ activities mainly fall under the 1-digit
industry (NACE rev 2) C - Manufacturing
energy 1 if the merging parties’ activities mainly fall under the 1-digit
industry (NACE rev 2) D - Energy
telecoms 1 if the merging parties’ activities mainly fall under the 1-digit
industry (NACE rev 2) J - Telecommunications
otherind 1 if the merging parties’ domiciles are not in the three above cat-
egories; 0 otherwise
2004reform 1 if the merger was notified under Council Regulation 139/2004;
0 otherwise
day number of the day the merger was notified, where 1st Janauary
1999 is given the value 1, 2nd January 1999 is 2, and so on
caseload mean number of mergers (excluding Phase I unconditional clear-
ances and withdrawals) investigated per 100 case officers per day
of the Phase I investigation
caseloadsq the square of caseload
indexp number of mergers within a 3-digit industry (NACE rev 2) that
the Commission had investigated prior to and inclusive of the
relevant merger since merger control was introduced (excluding
Phase I unconditional clearances and withdrawals); when a merger
falls into two or more 3-digit industries the minimum experience
is used
Table 1: description of variables
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variable description
%noharmmkts percentage of horizontally-affected markets where the merged en-
tity’s market share is less than 35% and there is no serious dis-
cussion of coordinated effects
#harmmkts total number of horizontally-affected markets where the merged
entity’s market share is at least 35% and where there is a pre-
sumption of unilateral or coordinated effects
#intermediatemkts total number of horizontally-affected markets where the merged
entity’s market share is at least 35% and where there is not a
presumption of unilateral or coordinated effects
verteffects 1 if at least one vertical relationship was seriously considered for
anti-competitive effects; 0 otherwise
conglomeffects 1 if conglomerate effects were seriously considered; 0 otherwise
potcomp 1 if it was seriously considered whether the merger eliminated a
merging party as a potential entrant in at least one market; 0
otherwise
coordeffects 1 if coordinated effects were seriously considered in at least one
market; 0 otherwise
efficiencydef 1 if an efficiency defence was seriously considered; 0 otherwise
failingfirm 1 if a failing firm defence was seriously considered; 0 otherwise
Table 1 continued: description of variables
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics of the full sample. Just over 60% settled
in Phase I. Of the 58 referred to Phase II, there were 37 conditional clearances (i.e.
with remedies), 13 unconditional clearances and eight prohibitions. Nearly two-
thirds of the mergers were between European firms, but at least one US firm was
involved in just over a quarter of merger cases.39 The Commission’s experience
of an industry varied from none to 41 previous cases since the introduction of
ECMR.40 Over 70% of the mergers were notified before the 2004 reforms. Our
caseload index ranges from a third of the mean in slack times up to twice the mean
during busy periods.41
39Of the remaining mergers, eight are between a European firm and a non-European/non-US
firm, and five are between firms whose domestic markets were outside of Europe and the US.
40The Commission had no previous industry experience for 16 mergers in our sample. The
industry in which it had most experience as of December 2006 was: C20 - Manufacture of chemicals
and chemical products.
41The number of case officers at DG Competition increased from 255 in 1999 to 495 in 2006.
The data on the number of case analysts were provided by DG Competition. We were provided
with annual data measured in October of each year. Since it is unknown when extra case analysts
were recruited, we assume that the rate of change between one year and the next is the same for
one month and the next. The increase occurs at the beginning of the month and the number of
case analysts remains constant for the rest of the month. The following results are robust if we
assume that all new analysts are recruited in October of each year.
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variable nobs mean std dev min max
phase2 150 0.3867 0.4886 0 1
eeaonly 150 0.6467 0.4796 0 1
usonly 150 0.0933 0.2919 0 1
eeaus 150 0.1733 0.3798 0 1
otherhome 150 0.0867 0.2823 0 1
manufacturing 150 0.6667 0.4730 0 1
energy 150 0.0400 0.1966 0 1
telecoms 150 0.0933 0.2919 0 1
otherind 150 0.2000 0.4013 0 1
indexp 150 10.0233 9.4829 1 42
day 150 1296.9870 870.1610 14 2848
2004reform 150 0.2800 0.4505 0 1
caseload 150 2.3440 1.1892 0.74 5.24
%noharmmkts 150 29.2209 25.8004 0 90.91
#intermediatemkts 150 5.4733 8.7873 0 63
#harmmkts 150 4.7600 8.4446 0 66
verteffects 150 0.4000 0.4915 0 1
conglomeffects 150 0.1800 0.3855 0 1
potcomp 150 0.2000 0.4013 0 1
coordeffects 150 0.2467 0.4325 0 1
efficiencydef 150 0.0200 0.1405 0 1
failingfirm 150 0.0200 0.1405 0 1
Table 2: descriptive statistics
An average of 29% of markets had clear presumption of no harm by our struc-
tural definition, but this ranged from zero to 91%. Turning to a strong presumption
of harm, there was an average of five such markets per merger, ranging between
zero and 66. There was a similar average number and range of markets falling
between the two presumptions. It is standard practice for the Commission to con-
sider every horizontal market for unilateral effects before considering alternative
theories of harm. The most common non-unilateral theory of harm was vertical
effects, discussed in 40% of cases. Coordinated effects were seriously considered in
about a quarter of mergers, removal of a potential competitor in 20% and conglom-
erate effects in 18%. There were only three mergers where a failing firm defence
was seriously considered, and another three where the merging parties argued an
efficiency defence.
20
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Probability of referral to Phase II
The two-phase process with strict time limits leaves little room for variation in the
timing of agreements. Remedies are either agreed in Phase I (after approx 4-5
weeks) or in Phase II (after approx another 4-5 months). Given this binary nature
(i.e. remedies agreed in Phase I or not), we adopt a standard probit specification
for referral:
y∗ = xβ + u, phase2 = 1 [y∗ > 0] where u ∼ N(0, 1) (2)
where y∗ is the latent variable for referral to Phase II and its observable counterpart,
phase2 ; and 1 [.] denotes an indictor function in which the function equals 1 if the
term in brackets is true, and 0 otherwise. The specification of vector x follows from
section 3. Equation (2) can be estimated by Probit and the results are reported in
Table 3.
The maximum number of observations is reduced from the 150 reported in the
descriptive statistics due to two perfect correlations. First, all three mergers in
which the Commission seriously investigated a failing firm defence were agreed in
Phase II, which creates a perfect correlation with referral. Second, three cases
claiming an efficiency defence were all referred to Phase II where they were settled
with remedies. We return to these defences in our conclusions. This leaves a
maximum of 144 observations. Following our discussion in section 3.1, we report
results based on three samples. Our baseline Sample 1 is chosen to minimise
potential selection bias, a possibility that is investigated through the other two
samples. Sample 1 includes all settlements and prohibitions and excludes Phase II
unconditional clearances. Sample 2 includes only Phase I and Phase II settlements,
and Sample 3 includes all settlements, prohibitions and Phase II unconditional
clearances. Samples 2 and 3 are discussed in Section 4.2.
The Sample 1 results are in column (1) alongside the marginal effects (mfx).
We find support for the role of referral costs in reaching agreement. The coefficient
on%noharmmkts is negative and significant - a higher proportion of uncontroversial
markets significantly decreases the probability of referral to Phase II. We interpret
this as a higher opportunity cost of referral, which encourages the merging parties
to make an offer that is more likely to be accepted by the agency. The marginal
effects suggest that increasing %noharmmkts by ten percentage points leads to a
5% point decrease in the probability of referral.
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Dependent variable:
phase2 proxy (1) mfx (2) (3)
constant -2.6644 -2.4255 -3.1780*
(1.8527) (2.0024) (1.6686)
%noharmmkts K -0.0194** -0.0051 -0.0168** -0.0105*
(0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0061)
#harmmkts α̂ (or s) 0.0368* 0.0097 0.0292 0.0263
(0.0224) (0.0238) (0.0203)
#intermediatemkts s -0.0049 -0.0025 -0.0191
(0.0211) (0.0218) (0.0192)
caseload s 1.5405** 0.4079 1.2895** 1.0314*
(0.6150) (0.6579) (0.5902)
caseloadsq s -0.2253** -0.0596 -0.1921* -0.1359
(0.0952) (0.1016) (0.0955)
2004reform s -1.5344*** -0.2871 -1.4237*** -0.9604**
(0.4543) (0.4643) (0.3900)
ln(day) s 0.2058 0.1914 0.3049*
(0.1982) (0.2104) (0.1774)
ln(indexp) s -0.5383*** -0.1425 -0.5145*** -0.3919***
(0.1709) (0.1710) (0.1417)
potcomp s 0.9797** 0.3170 0.9717** 1.1943***
(0.4276) (0.4484) (0.3652)
verteffects s 0.4533 0.5445* 0.8020***
(0.3051) (0.3194) (0.2816)
conglomeffects s 0.3712 0.4705 -0.0488
(0.4036) (0.4166) (0.3872)
coordeffects s 0.6629* 0.2046 0.4432 1.0270***
(0.3627) (0.3943) (0.2916)
energy 1.2411 1.3508* 0.4868
(0.7888) (0.7369) (0.7592)
telecoms -1.0023* -0.1729 -1.0757* -1.1759**
(0.5410) (0.5862) (0.5165)
otherind -1.3558*** -0.2435 -1.3469*** -1.1268***
(0.4452) (0.4600) (0.3902)
usonly 0.3430 0.2022 0.2424
(0.4170) (0.4380) (0.4255)
eeaus -1.4467*** -0.2384 -1.1924** -0.9724***
(0.5164) (0.4955) (0.3769)
otherhome -0.2170 -0.0030 -0.2738
(0.5619) (0.5614) (0.4956)
no. of observations 133 125 144
log pseudo-likelihood -47.3798 -43.2285 -63.0622
pseudo r-squared 0.4233 0.4009 0.3304
Note: *** indicates significance on a 2-tailed test at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level; and *
at the 10% level. (1) main sample; (2) excl. prohibitions; (3) incl. unconditional clearances
Table 3: Probit analysis of referral to Phase II
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It is not so straighforward to disprove the effect of potential harm on referral.
All we claim is that our results are consistent with there being no monotonic rela-
tionship between the probability of referral and the potential harm of the merger.
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, we constructed a range of proxies but the only one
that approaches significance is#harmmkts.42 This measure may also be picking up
a dimension of complexity in the agency’s task if it has to deal with evidence by the
parties to counter a structural presumption of harm and evaluate an appropriate
remedy.
Our proxies for the uncertainty of the agency’s findings can be grouped un-
der agency capacity and economic analysis. Both sets of measures support our
expectation that uncertainty increases the probability of referral to Phase II.
First, consider our workload and process measures. The coefficients on case-
load and caseloadsq imply an inverted-U shaped relationship. There is a positive
effect on the probability of referral up to around one standard deviation above its
mean value as investigation teams are less fully staffed and so less able to make
accurate assessments. However, there appears to come a point beyond which there
is evidence of a possible desk-clearing effect as concerns about Phase II workload
increase.43 The coefficient on 2004reform is negative and significant, which sug-
gests that the reforms in 2004 had a net effect of substantially increased clarity and
transparency. The insignificance of day suggests no generalised learning during
the period. However, the coefficient on indexp is negative and strongly significant.
The first case in a 3-digit industry is 33% points more likely to be referred to Phase
II than the tenth case. Finally, the number of markets with market share patterns
that lie between presumptions of either harm or no harm, #intermediatemkts, is
not significant.
The second dimension to uncertainty in relation to the agency’s findings is com-
plexity of the economic analysis. Both coordeffects and potcomp have a significantly
positive impact on the probability of referral to Phase II. This is consistent with a
greater difficulty in collecting evidence to prove (or disprove) either a coordinated
effects theory of harm or especially the absence of incentive or ability to enter.
Both verteffects and conglomeffects have positive signs but neither is statistically
significant. Furthermore, although we had to drop all observations of failingfirm
and efficiencydef from the regressions because all such cases were referred to Phase
II, this should not detract from the fact that these lines of defence were apparently
too complex to agree in Phase I.
Finally, we find quantitatively important political effects. Telecom mergers are
42Note that even the modest level of significance is not robust to a logarithmic transformation
(after adding one to each observation because some mergers had no markets in this category).
43An alternative explanation relates to the cost of referral for the merging parties during boom
periods: inasmuch as merger booms are positively correlated with economic booms, the merging
parties may face a larger opportunity cost of delay when the economy is booming.
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less likely to be referred to Phase II, which may reflect a willingness to accept net-
work effect or other arguments in a rapidly changing market. There is no evidence
of bias against mergers between two US firms or other non-European firms, but
mergers between US and European firms are significantly more likely to be settled
in Phase I. The latter may be because they tend to have complementary strengths,
for example in terms of geographic markets, or it may reflect a political dimension
of support for transatlantic cooperation.
4.2 Sample robustness checks
As discussed in Section 3.1, there is a potential selection bias due to the absence of
information on withdrawn mergers. Some Phase II withdrawals will have been in
anticipation of prohibition so our sample may under-represent cases with features
that lead to referral. We investigate this by considering the effect of excluding the
eight prohibitions which we expect may have similar characteristics to many of the
mergers that were withdrawn in Phase II. This gives Sample 2 which estimates the
probability of referral to Phase II conditional on remedies being agreed. There are
no substantial changes in either statistical or quantitative significance, but there
are some interesting nuances. The coefficient on #harmmkts loses its marginal
significance, suggesting that if we had data on Phase II withdrawals as well as
prohibitions, the significance of this variable may have been enhanced. Other
variables that might similarly have an enhanced effect if we had data on withdrawals
are coordeffects and, to a lesser extent, %noharmmkts and caseload.
Sample 3 adds unconditional clearances in Phase II to our baseline Sample 1.
These are excluded from our baseline sample on the grounds that they are not anti-
competitive mergers appropriate for remedy settlement and they are not balanced
by marginal unconditional clearances in Phase I. As expected, their inclusion gen-
erally reduces the fit of the model, with the exception of three indicators of complex
theories of harm: potcomp, verteffects and coordeffects. This can be explained by
these theories of harm often being speculative, requiring in-depth analysis, and
being less amenable to remedy, leading to a stark choice of unconditional clearance
or prohibition.
4.3 Early settlement, probability of referral and type of error
Applying Corollary 1, we can use our estimations to cast light on likely Type 1 or
Type 2 errors in Phase I merger remedy settlements. Type 2 errors are expected
for mergers settled in Phase I despite a high probability of referral, and Type 1
errors are likely in settlements with a low probability of referral. Based on Sample
1 results, we calculate the predicted probability of referral for each merger. Since
the theoretical prediction is that only the variables which increase uncertainty and
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cost of delay determine errors in early settlments, we control for the effects of
the other factors discussed in section 3.2.4. To do so, we calculate the predicted
probabilities for 144 hypothetical mergers where, others things equal, it is assumed
that for all such mergers eeaonly = 1 and manufacturing=1. Figure 2 provides the
cumulative distribution of the controlled predicted probability of referral to Phase
II for Phase I settlements and for mergers that were referred.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of early settlements and referrals
First, consider those mergers settled in Phase I. If the merger is complex, with
high s and low K, the merging firms may have achieved a significantly anticom-
petitive merger by offering too little remedy and getting lucky with the Phase I
evidence gathered by the Commission. Just 11 of such mergers were settled despite
a controlled predicted probability greater than 0.5. They are listed in Table 4 with
their controlled predicted probability and the ‘actual’ predicted probability based
on the full probit regression.44 Although the uniform distribution special case
suggests the scale of error increases monotonically with the predicted probability
of referral, this result is not robust to a more general distribution so it is not clear
which of these mergers has the largest Type 2 error. We conclude that Type 2
errors are relatively infrequent at only 12% of Phase I settlements.
44Only 6 mergers have an actual predicted probability greater than 0.5.
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merger notified controlled
pr(phase2)
actual
pr(phase2)
YLE/TDF/DIGITA 05/2001 0.964 0.964
AKZO NOBEL/HOECHST ROUSSEL VET 10/1999 0.951 0.583
NEW HOLLAND/CASE 09/1999 0.919 0.480
UNILEVER/BESTFOODS 08/2000 0.872 0.377
TEIJIN/ZEON 06/2003 0.773 0.703
LINDE/BOC 04/2006 0.731 0.731
REXAM (PLM)/AMERICAN NATIONAL CAN 06/2000 0.706 0.182
GLAXO WELLCOME/SMITHKLINE BEECHAM 03/2000 0.647 0.143
SARA LEE/COURTAULDS 03/2000 0.643 0.140
CANDOVER/CINVEN/BERTELSMANN-SPRINGER 06/2003 0.584 0.584
RHODIA/DONAU CHEMIE/ALBRIGHT & WILSON 05/1999 0.527 0.527
Table 4: Mergers settled in Phase I with a predicted Type 2 error
In contrast, there are many more cases where we predict Type 1 error, with
50% of settlements having a referral probability of less than 0.1. While this
suggests a larger number of Type 1 errors compared to Type 2, it does not take
the relative cost of such errors into account. If a merger is straightforward with
low uncertainty, s, and low cost of delay, K, the model predicts only a marginal
excess in the optimal remedy offer. In practice, given that assets are not perfectly
divisible, such cases may not have resulted in significant inefficiency. As Figure 1
indicates, the greatest Type 1 error could be at intermediate levels of K and s.
It is also possible to cast light on referral errors. All failures to agree in Phase
I are costly, but delayed mergers with a high probability of referral are delayed
for a reason. In contrast, our model suggests that mergers with a low probability
of failure to agree in Phase I are referral errors that are due to either very bad
luck in the evidence collected by the Commission, or the Commission’s error, or
a strategic mistake by the firms. Figure 2 shows that 42% of referrals had a
controlled predicted probability of less than 0.5. We also note that six of the eight
lowest controlled predicted probabilities (out of those actually referred) went on to
be cleared unconditionally in Phase II. These cases appear to go beyond bad luck.
4.4 Related empirical literature
This is the first study to our knowledge that investigates the timing of antitrust
remedy settlements. Our results broaden the limited set of empirical applications of
tort settlement theory and provide stronger results on the importance of uncertainty
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than have typically been found.45 For example, Fournier and Zuehlke (1996) find
that the probability of settlement in US civil lawsuits is increasing in litigation
costs and decreasing in the potential value of the court award, but their measure
of the expected variability of court outcomes is not statistically significant.46 Fenn
and Rickman (1999, 2001) do not have a measure of uncertainty but find similar
results on costs and potential size of damages for UK clinical negligence, health
trust empolyment, and personal injury insurance claims. Kessler (1996) does find
that complexity delays settlement and there are some subtle effects of institutional
delay costs in his study of US automobile bodily injury claims. Because these
studies investigate damagess claims, they cannot make inferences about Type 1
and Type 2 errors in specific cases.
Econometric work on merger decisions has focused on the determinants of inter-
vention. For example, Bergman et al (2005) aim to explain European Commission
intervention decisions.47 Similar econometric studies have used data from US and
other jurisdictions.48 While Kouliavtsev (2007) is nearer in spirit to the present
paper. His empirical model aims to explain the strength of the agreed remedy
using US data on DOJ merger settlements. Strength is measured by the ratio of
divested assets to total overlap sales, so there is no account taken of competitive
impact. His “hostage” measure (similar to our measure of referral cost) signifi-
cantly increases this measure of the strength of agreed remedy. He has no proxies
for complexity or uncertainty.49
There has been a small number of ex post case study reviews of the success
or failure of remedies. Such studies are highly resource intensive, subjective and
require the cooperation of firms and rivals for a period of years following the merger.
This means that they have been conducted in-house by the agencies on a sample
of their own selection. A study by the US Federal Trade Commission (1999)
45Much of the literature investigates medical damage settlements. Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989)
review the early empirical literature on legal disputes. There is also a wider literature on bar-
gaining under incomplete information without the shadow of the court. Reviews are provided by
Kennan and Wilson (1993) and Ausubel et al (2002). Sieg (2000) provides structural estimation
of a bargaining model calibrated on medical malpractice suits in Florida.
46 In an earlier paper using the same data, Fournier and Zuehlke (1989) do find their measure of
variance to be a significant determinant of settlement. The more recent paper is based on Spier’s
(1992) hazard model.
47They include a sample of Phase I unconditional clearances and classify Phase I remedy agree-
ments as non-interventions. Because the dependent variable is intervention, they find market share
measures significant and do not include measures of referral costs or complexity/uncertainty. See
also Lindsay et al (2003) and Martinez Fernández et al (2008) for similar studies using EC data.
Ormosi (2009) provides an econometric study of remedies and the efficiency defence.
48Most notably, there have been numerous US studies by Malcolm Coate and various co-authors,
including Coate et al (1995) and Coate and Kleit (2004).
49He also has measures of DOJ case load and the hypothetical probability that the merger
would be prohibited in court (based on a simple model of concentration, reported entry barriers
and likely collusion, each measured in the most concentrated market). The case load measure
is insignificant. The prohibition probability, which can be interpreted as a measure of potential
harm, is quadratic with weakest remedies at intermediate levels of harm.
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found that merging firms could undermine the effectiveness of divestitures, for
example, by offering a product range that is too narrow to be viable. The European
Commission (2005b) conducted its own ex post study of remedies in 40 decisions
1996-2000. They found similar problems to the FTC, especially an inadequate
range of assets being offered for sale. Only 57% of remedies were judged to have
been clearly effective. Whilst rich in detail, they do not substitute for a more
statisical approach.
An alternative statistical methodology to identify agency decision errors is pro-
vided by event studies. Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) first proposed the idea
that the change in stock market value of rival firms at the time of a horizontal
merger announcement could be used to identify expected competitive effect. If
rival stock prices rise, this suggests the merger will be anti-competitive, and if ri-
val valuations fall it is consistent with an efficient merger enhancing competition.
The approach has much intuitive appeal but has been subject to substantive criti-
cisms.50 Duso et al (2007) appreciate these problems but argue that there is still
information in this approach and apply it to a sample of all EC merger decisions in
a period overlapping our own sample. Their sample is a roughly equal number of
Phase II cases (most of which required remedies or prohibition) and a random sam-
ple of Phase I cases (most of which were cleared unconditionally). They assume
that the stockmarket capitalises competitive impact but not anticipated remedies
or prohibition. Their definition of a Type 2 error is an unconditional clearance in
Phase II. This is quite different to our definition so our results are not compara-
ble.51
5 Conclusion
Agreement over remedies under the European merger regulation provides an un-
usual opportunity to model and test a theory of settlement. The institutional
setting, including a fixed timetable of offers, gives a common structure to merger
settlements. It also facilitates collection of data on agreements that differ by
50Criticisms include that: effects on rivals may not measure competitive impact so much as
putting them either “in play” or “out of play” in the market for corporate control; announcements
may signal the ability of rivals to achieve efficiencies themselves; affected markets are often only
a small part of the activities of conglomerate firms and so may have a negligible effect on share
price; difficulty in identifying competitors in narrowly defined antitrust markets; stock market
arbitragers may not be able to predict competitive effects (on either the merging parties or their
rivals) in a few days around the merger announcement when it takes a competition agency many
weeks; it is essentially a judgement call for the econometrician to interpret stock price changes as
capitalising or not regulatory intervention by the agency (remedies or prohibition).
51On their definition, they find that 56% of all anti-competitive mergers are Type 2 errors
(i.e. no remedies required) and 42% of pro-competitive mergers are Type 1 errors (i.e. remedies or
prohibition). They go on to conduct a probit analysis of the incidence of error in terms of political
economy factors. Aktas et al (2007) also use an event study of EC merger announcements and
subsequent interventions to examine political economy issues.
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individual merger characteristics such as uncertainty. Merger settlements are par-
ticularly interesting because they aim to prevent future anticompetitive behaviour,
unlike damages claims which are transfers following some previous harm. Merger
control is thus subject to Type 1 or Type 2 error, depending on whether remedies
are too restrictive or too lenient. Our model provides a link between the probability
of delay in settlement and the expected type of error in early agreement.
We find that parties condition their offers on the degree of uncertainty (mea-
sured by the complexity of merger appraisal and the pressure on agency resources)
and the cost of referral. Merging firms make more generous offers in Phase I if
the the cost of referral would be high. A high case load, up to a point, makes it
more difficult for the agency to discover the true competitive effects and so makes it
more difficult to reach early agreement. There are also significant learning effects
as the agency’s findings become more predictable when it has more industry-specific
experience. Major administrative reforms in 2004 appear to have improved pre-
dictability. The difficulty of appraising coordinated effects, potential entry or the
failing firm or efficiency defenses mean these are likely to cause delay in settlement.
We cannot prove emprically that the potential anticompetitiveness of the merger
has no effect on referral. However, consistent with our theoretical model, we find
no evidence to support a superficially plausible claim that more harmful mergers
are harder to agree in Phase I.
A wider implication of our findings is that we can associate Type 2 errors
(e.g. too little required divestiture of assets) with early agreement of remedies in
complex mergers with a low cost of delay. These are the mergers where firms find it
worthwhile to bluff (i.e. to offer inadequate remedies) and the agency does not find
sufficient evidence of anticompetitive harm in its initial investigations. Although
some of these mergers may have caused substantial welfare loss, we also find that
they are relatively few in number. More often, early agreement is associated with
firms offering excess remedy (Type 1 error).
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A Appendix: analysis and proofs
A.1 Optimal offers
Given that true α̂ is revealed to the agency in Phase II and piz (α̂, z) > 0, z
∗
2 = 0.
Firms can withdraw from Phase II (and the merger) if pi (α̂, 0) − K < 0, so if
there is failure to agree remedies in Phase I, the merging firms receive pi∗2(α̂,K) =
max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]}.
Now consider Phase I. The probability of referral to Phase II (i.e. that z1 < z
O
1 )
is F (zO1 , s). Expected profit is
pi1 = pi
(
α̂, zO1
)
[1− F (zO1 , s)] + F (z
O
1 , s)max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]} . (3)
Lemma 1 pi1 is locally concave and decreasing at z
O
1 = z1.
Proof. The second derivative of (3) is
A1 ≡ −{2f(z∗1 , s) [piz (α̂, z
∗
1)] + fz(z
∗
1 , s)[pi (α̂, z
∗
1)−max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]}]
−pizz (α̂, z∗1) [1− F (z
∗
1 , s)]} < 0.
(4)
Log-concavity of 1−F (.) implies:
[
f(.)2 + [1− F (.)]fz(.)
]
≥ 0. For local concavity
around an interior optimum, substitute the first order condition (5) [from below]
and rearrange to give f(.)piz(.) + fz(.)[pi (α̂+ z
∗
1)− pi
∗
2(.)] ≥ 0. The term in square
brackets must be positive or it would not be profitable to agree in Phase I. From
this it is clear that the sum of the first two terms in (4) is positive. If pizz(.) ≤
0, then (4) is surely satisfied. If pizz(.) > 0, then log-concavity of pi(.) after
substituting (5) gives −pizz (.) [1 − F (.)] + f(.)piz (.) ≥ 0. Adding this inequality
to f(.)piz(.) + fz(.)[pi (α̂, z∗1) − pi
∗
2(.)] ≥ 0 proves A1 < 0 as long as at least one of
the log-concavity assumptions is strict. Next consider the payoff to a marginally
more aggressive offer at z1. Noting that pi (α̂, z∗1) > pi
∗
2(.), piz = −[pi (α̂, z1) −
max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]}]f(z1, s) < 0 for all s and K.
The next lemma prepares the ground for examining corner solutions. Noting
that F (z1, s) = 0, at the lower bound to the evidence distribution: piz(s,K) =
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piz (α̂, z1(s))− [pi (α̂, z1(s))−max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]}]f(z1(s), s). α̂ is suppressed as
an argument of piz(.) to simplify notation. Define s˜(K) as s satisfying piz(s˜,K) = 0,
if this exists, or zero otherwise.
Lemma 2 (a) Lower bound expected marginal profit, piz(s,K), is increasing in s.
(b) piz(0,K) < 0, piz(s,K) ≤ 0 for all s ≤ s˜(K), and piz(s,K) > 0 for all s > s˜(K).
(c) s˜(0) = 0. (d) ds˜(K)
dK
≥ 0.
Proof. (a)
dpi
z
ds
= [pizz (α̂, z1(s))− f(z1(s), s)piz (α̂, z1(s))]
dz
1
(s)
ds
−
[
piz (α̂, z1(s))
df(z
1
(s),s)
ds
]
.
The first term in square brackets is negative by the log-concavity assumptions
(see proof of Lemma 1).
dz
1
(s)
ds
and the second term in square brackets are
negative by our definition of increasing spread. Thus,
dpi
z
ds
> 0. (b) Sup-
pose s = 0, then f(0, 0) is a spike and piz(0,K) < 0. piz(s,K) > 0 for all
s > s˜(K) follows from
dpi
z
ds
> 0 and the definition of s˜(K). (c) If K = 0, then
piz(s, 0) = piz (α̂, z1(s)) − [pi (α̂, z1(s)) − pi (α̂, 0)]f(z1(s), s) > 0 for all s because
pi (α̂, z1(s)) < pi (α̂, 0), so s˜(0) = 0 by definition of s˜. (d) If [pi (α̂, 0) − K] ≤ 0,
ds˜(K)
dK
= 0; and if [pi (α̂, 0)−K] > 0, ds˜(K)
dK
> 0. This follows from total differentia-
tion of piz(s,K) = 0 and log-concavity (see Lemma 1).
Lemma 3 For s < s˜, there is a corner optimum offer: z∗1 = z1. For s ≥ s˜, there
is an interior optimum satisfying:
piz (α̂, z
∗
1) [1− F (z
∗
1 , s)]− [pi (α̂, z
∗
1)−max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]}]f(z
∗
1 , s) = 0. (5)
Proof. If s < s˜, it is not profitable to offer more than z1 because piz(s,K) ≤ 0
(Lemma 2(b)). If s ≥ s˜, piz(s) > 0 and the interior optimum is given by the first
order condition (5). The upper bound is never a corner optimum because piz < 0
for all s and K (Lemma 1).
Lemma 4 provides the key results linking merger characteristics to the optimal
offer. Define ŝ(K) as the minimum s > 0 for which z∗1 = 0. From this definition
and Lemma 3, s˜ < ŝ.
Lemma 4 (a) z∗1(α̂, s,K) is weakly decreasing in K, with z
∗
1(α̂, s, 0) > 0 and
z∗1(α̂, s,K) < 0 for some s and K > 0; (b) z
∗
1(α̂, s,K) < (>) 0 as s < (>) ŝ; and
(c) , z∗1(α̂, s,K) is non-monotonic in α̂ except in special cases (in which it may be
either increasing or decreasing).
Proof. (a) From Lemma 3, if s > s˜ and pi (α̂, 0)−K ≤ 0, total differentiation of (5)
gives
dz∗
1
dK
= f(z∗1 , s)/A1 < 0 (by Lemma 1). Also, the marginal profit of a slightly
more aggressive offer at K = 0 and zO1 = 0 is
1
2piz (α̂, 0) > 0. This is because the
evidence distribution is unbiased so F (0, s) = 12 . Thus, z
∗
1(α̂, s, 0) > 0. If s < s˜
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or pi (α̂, 0)−K ≤ 0, the optimum offer is independent of K. Finally, the proof of
part (b) shows that z∗1(α̂, s,K) < 0 for sufficiently small s (including s ∈ [s˜, ŝ]).
(b) If s < s˜, z∗1 = z1(s) < 0 which is decreasing in s by assumption. Next
consider s > s˜. Standard comparative statics cannot sign
dz∗
1
ds
because all com-
binations of sign are possible in relation to Fs(z∗1 , s) and fs(z
∗
1, s) (see below on
‘increasing spread’). We proceed by considering the cases of z∗1 < 0, z
∗
1 = 0
and z∗1 > 0 in turn. By the properties of the corner solution for sufficiently
low s and the definition of ŝ, z∗1 < 0 for all s ∈ (0, ŝ]. At z
∗
1 = 0, our as-
sumption of unbiased evidence distribution implies Fs(0, s) = 0 and fs(0, s) < 0
(see also below on ‘increasing spread’), so total differentiation of (5) gives
dz∗
1
ds
=
{[pi (α̂, 0)−max {0, [pi (α̂, 0)−K]} fs(0, s)} /A1 > 0. This implies z
∗
1 > 0 for all
s > ŝ because the optimum can never ‘cross back’ to z∗1 < 0. Note that for suffi-
ciently low K, we show in part (a) that z∗1 > 0, and for sufficiently low s we have
just shown that z∗1 < 0, so ŝ > 0.
(c) If s < s˜, z∗1 = z1(s) is independent of α̂. Next consider s > s˜. We proceed
by counter-examples for a simple special case. Suppose pi (α̂, z∗1) = pi (α̂+ z
∗
1). If
pi (α̂, 0)−K > 0, then
dz∗
1
dα̂
= −{pizz (α̂+ z
∗
1) [1− F (z
∗
1, s)]− [piz (α̂+ z
∗
1)− piz (α̂)] f(z
∗
1, s)} /A1,
which cannot be signed. For example, if pizz (α̂+ z
∗
1) > 0 and z
∗
1 ≤ 0, then
dz∗
1
dα̂
> 0.
If profits are linear, pizz (α̂+ z
∗
1) = 0 and piz (α̂+ z
∗
1) = piz (α̂) so
dz∗
1
dα̂
= 0. If
pi (α̂)−K ≤ 0, then
dz∗
1
dα̂
= −{pizz (α̂+ z
∗
1) [1− F (z
∗
1 , s)]− piz (α̂, z
∗
1) f(z
∗
1, s)} /A1 <
0 by log-concavity. No sharper results are possible when pi (α̂, z∗1) cannot be written
as pi (α̂+ z∗1).
Proposition 1 follows as a corollary of Lemma 4. If the evidence drawn by the
agency in Phase I is such that z1 > z
∗
1, the merger will be settled subject to the
offered remedies. The error associated with settlement is given by Lemma 4.
A.2 Increasing spread
s is a mean-preserving index of the spread of F (.), and Figure A1 illustrates an
increase in spread where s′ > s′′ > 0.
Figure A1: a reduction in the spread of the distribution
There are four ranges, each with a different combination of signs on Fs(.) and fs(.):
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Fs(.) > 0 Fs(.) < 0
fs(.) > 0 A D
fs(.) < 0 B C
B Appendix: Construction of variables
A partly-censored version of every merger decision by the European Commission is
published on its website.52 The website also provides general information including:
(i) the formal decision; (ii) the regulation used; (iii) the date of notification, date of
referral to Phase II (if applicable), and the date of decision; and (iv) the statistical
classification of the parties’ economic activities (NACE). From this we constructed:
phase2, 2004reform, indexp, day and the industry dummies. We constructed
caseload from start and end dates for each merger investigation and data on the
number of relevant staff (provided to us by DG Competition). The domiciles of
the parties are usually stated in decisions, and in the few cases where it was not
disclosed this was obtained from the firms’ websites or annual reports. To identify
specific competitive effects analysed in each merger, we word-searched each decision
for the relevant terms in Table B1. Where such terms were found, a close read
of the text determined whether there was serious discussion or whether it was
mentioned in a cursory manner simply to dismiss the possibility. We counted only
the former.
variable words searched
coordeffects coordinat[ed], collective dominance, collusi[on]
verteffects vertical, foreclos[ure]
conglomeffects conglomerate, bundl[ing], portfolio
potcomp potential comp[etitor], entr[ant]
efficiencydef efficien[cy], cost saving[s], synerg[y]
failingfirm failing firm, rescue merger
Note: For words with [.], we only searched for the term before the square
brackets so the word search also identified plurals and similar words (e.g.
coordinat[ed] and coordinat[ion]).
Table B1: terms searched
The remaining variables are based on market shares in those markets where the
merger joins a horizontal overlap of activities. This does not mean that market
share is all that matters or that the Commission ignores competitively relevant
factors such as product substitutability, nature of competition, buyer power or en-
try barriers. Our concern is to avoid distortions that might arise from collecting
52See: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/
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subjective data from merger reports. As explained in the text, we do not use
qualitative variables in our econometrics because there is a strong suspicion of a
reporting bias. For example, entry barriers are much more likely to be mentioned
explicitly to justify decisions when there is failure to agree, even though they should
also be relevant for markets where harm is expected by the agency absent agreed
remedies: ‘high’ entry barriers are explicitly mentioned in 35.8% of Phase I settle-
ments compared to 55.3% in Phase II and 100% of prohibitions.53 Neverteless, we
return to a sensitivity test of subjective measures at the end of this Appendix.
Our first aim was to identify the number of relevant markets in a merger that
might require competition analysis. Data are not generally available on the size
or value of each market. For the vast majority of markets with horizontal overlap,
especially those with a large combined market share, an estimate of the merging
parties’ combined market share, sM , is either reported directly in the documents or
can be calculated by adding the merging parties’ individual market shares (which is
the method that the Commission usually uses to estimate the merging parties’ com-
bined market share). However, markets are often not reported in detail when the
merging parties’ combined market share is sufficiently small such that competition
concerns are highly unlikely to arise from the merger. Close reading of numerous
decisions suggest a reporting threshold between 15% and 25%.54 To minimise any
noise or bias due to inconsistent reporting of markets with low combined market
shares, we did not count markets with a combined market share < 15% to arrive at
the number of relevant markets (#mkts). We tested the sensititvity of our results
by varying this cut-off threshold between 0% and 25% market shares. We found
no significant difference to our econometric results presented in section 4.
On a market by market basis, we index the merging party with the larger
pre-merger market share as 1 and the partner as 2, with market shares S1 and
S2 respectively and sM = S1 + S2. As explained in the text, market shares are
typically reported as being within a five or ten percentage point range in which
case we assumed the midpoint; for example, [30%− 40%] is taken as 35%. One
implication is that the last digit of most of our shares is either a five or a zero (or
less frequently 2.5 or 7.5). The incremental market share is not reported for 18.2%
of the 2,270 markets in our sample, including 113 markets with sM ≥ 50% (12.2%
of such markets). When not reported, we set s2 at the midpoint between a notional
minimum overlap of 5% and sM/2. A sensitivity test assuming unreported S2 =
sM/2 leaves the results in Table 3 virtually unchanged, except that #harmmkts is
53Unsurprisingly, reported high entry barriers are usually significant in the empirical studies of
merger interventions reviewed in section 4.4.
54For example, it was stated in M.1378 — Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc that “there is only one affected
market, where the share of the parties exceeds 15%” (p21) and in M.1878 — Pfizer/Warner Lambert
that “In 11 national markets, the operation does not give rise to competition concerns because
the aggregated market share of the parties remains below 25%” (p10).
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insignificant at the 10% level.
Markets where there is unlikely to be a finding of lessening competition are
those with both sM < 35% and no serious discussion of coordinated effects as the
main theory of harm. Dividing the number of such markets (#noharmmkts) by
#mkts, we constructed: %noharmmkts.
We draw on Davies et al (2011) to identify market share combinations for which
the European Commission is likely to have a strong presumption of competitive
harm.55 By examining a large number of decisions, they show that the combined
market share, the incremental market share and the leading rival’s market share
(sR) are strongly related to findings of unilateral and coordinated effects. For
unilateral effects, a higher sM may be allowed if S2 is relatively small. The role
of sR in unilateral effects is that of a ‘strong rival’, typically one larger than the
merged entity. Our definition of a strong presumption of unilateral effects excludes
cases of sR > sM . We define a strong presumption as when:
sM ≥ 50%+X% and s2 ≥ 20%−X% where X = {0, 5, 10, 15, 20}.
Similarly, we define a strong presumption of coordinated effects as when:
sM ≥ 35% and sR ≥ 35%,
and the market does not qualify for a strong presumption of unilateral effects.
Adding the number of markets with strong presumptions of unilateral and coordi-
nated effects, we get: #harmmkts.
The number of intermediate markets lying between strong presumptions of
harm and no harm is: #intermediatemkts = #mkts−#noharmmkts−#harmmkts.
We constructed a range of alternative variables in an attempt to design bet-
ter proxies for potential harm. These included market share based variants of
#harmmkts that only count the number of markets greater or equal to a certain
threshold, measures of mean combined market share for markets greater than a cer-
tain threshold, and the product of market shares (which captures the incremental
HHI). All tell a similar story: the variable attempting to capture potential harm
is insignificant and the other results are robust. We also constructed non-market-
share based measures. In particular, we used the Commission’s own opinion of
which markets ‘raise a concern’. Although, as discussed in the text, we prefer ob-
jective measures, the Commission’s opinion takes into account wider issues such as
barriers to entry, product substitutability and mitigating factors. When Commis-
sion opinion-based variables replace those based on market share, the only change
to the section 4 results is that #harmmkts is insignificant at the 10% level.
55See especially their Fig. 4.
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